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The London riots of 1886 are an important part of English working-class history and mythology, and 
this examination of parliamentary voting on the Compensation for Damages Bill, which was the response of 
Westminster to the riots, assesses the value of using social conflict theories to explain the pal icy formulations 
of political elites. The conclusions which follow from this are two: the Conservative party was indeed divided 
along class lines; but for the Liberals and Irish Nationalists and for the Conservatives who spoke in the debates, 
other factors- partisanship, the holding of government office, and, especially, constituency- were more im-
portant. For the London riots of 1886 and their parliamentary aftermath, social class describes with great force 
the nature of public disorder and the reaction of parliamentary Conservatives to it. For the Liberals and Irish 
Nationalists in Parliament, however, partisanship tamed social class and territorial conflict overlaid it . 
Les emeutes de Londres de 1886 ont une place importante dans /'histoire de Ia classe ouvriere anglaise. 
L' article qui suit est une analyse du vote du Parlement sur le ' 'Compensation for Damages Bill'· -pro jet de 
loi qui Jut Ia reponse de Westminster aux emeutes- qui rend compte de /'importance de Ia theorie de Ia lutte 
des classes dans Ia conduite des elites politiques. A ce sujet , on peut tirer deux grandes conclusions: le parti 
conservateur erait divise. de route evidence, seton les classes sociales; mais, au contraire, chez les Liberaux, 
/es nationalistes irlandois et les Conservateurs qui prirent part au de bat, d' autres facteurs -le militantisme, 
Ia retenue des charges gouvernementa/es, et, plus particulierement, Ia division entre districts e/ectoraux - furent 
plus importants. Lo division en classes sociales, perr;ues comme ayant ere au coeur des desordres de 1886, a 
done dicre Ia marche politique a suivre aux parlementaires conservateurs. Toutefois, des conflits d' ordre territorial 
ont derournes les Liberaux et /es nationalistes irlandais de Ia question de Ia lutte des classes. 
The Cabinet today decided in favour 
of giving compensation to those who 
were looted by the socialists. 
Lewis Harcourt Journal, 
22 February 1886 1 
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The London riots of 1886 occupy an important place in English working-class history 
and mythology because they reflect the political motivations of popular disturbances. It 
is also an incident which permits an assessment of the motivation of political elites. An 
examination of the London riots, and the political responses to them, makes possible a social 
analysis of political actions because, if conceptions of the class struggle are important for 
an understanding of working-class behaviour, it can be argued that parliamentary responses 
to social unrest were rooted in similar considerations. In a brief compass, the London riots 
of 1886 serve as an episode which illuminates both lower-class behaviour and the policy 
formulations of political elites. 
Conceptions of social class and the class struggle are among the most disputed issues 
in all of social history. ''A dire vrai, ' ' Marc Bloch once observed, ''ce mot declasse est 
un des plus equivoques du vocabulaire historique. " 2 And so it proves to be. Nevertheless, 
since much of nineteenth-century political analysis is cast in terms of a relationship between 
social structures and political actions, scholars return again and again to this difficult and 
complex subject. Namier believed the social history of England could be written from a 
knowledge of the social composition of the House of Commons. 3 The importance of class 
in British politics is made manifest in P.G.J. Pulzer's famous statement, "class is the basis 
of British politics; all else is embellishment and detail. " 4 Conceptually, definitions of social 
class have been fraught with vagueness and imprecision. A gentleman has been defined 
as a man having the capacity "to live idly and without manual labour. " 5 Sir George Sitwell, 
Bt., who sired a generation of great writers and who sat in the House of Commons in 1886, 
believed the development of a nation depended not upon geographical position, natural 
resources, or military strength, but ''upon the discussion of classes and their relation to 
each other and to the soil. " 6 
Musings such as these are not very helpful, and they are not wholly satisfying as 
organizing devices to set right the chaos of historical social experiences. Is class wealth 
or status or consciousness? Is it a structure or a category at all? On this E.P. Thompson, 
whom all quote on this subject and who must be quoted here, takes the line of doubt. In 
a famous passage he defines class ''as something which in fact happens (and can be shown 
to have happened) in human relationships." And directly Thompson puts the point rather 
more expansively: "We cannot have love without lovers, nor deference without squires 
and labourers. And class happens when some men, as a result of common experiences 
(inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves 
and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs." 
"Class is defined by men as they live their own history ," he says. "In the end, this is its 
only definition. " 7 In another place Thompson distinguishes between class as an historical 
category (it is something which changes over time), the sense in which he uses it, and so-
ciological conceptions which are static. 8 
2. Quoled in Alfred COBBAN, "The Vocabulary of Social History" , Political Science Quarterly, LXXI 
(March 1956), p. 6 . 
3. Sir Lewis NAMIER, England in the Age of the American Revolution (London: Macmillan, 1930), 
p. 3. 
4. P.G.J. PuL.ZER, Political Representation and Elections: Parties and Voting in Great Britain (New 
York: Praeger, 1967), p. 103. 
5. Quoled in Peter ROEBUCK, Yorkshire Baronets, 1640-1760: Families, Estates, and Fortunes (Oxford: 
University of Hull Press, 1980), p. I. 
6. Quoted in COBBAN, "Vocabulary of Social History" , p. I. 
7. E.P. THOMPSON, The Making of the English Working Class (London: Gollancz, 1963), pp. 9, II . 
8. E.P. THOMPSON, "Eighteenlh-a!ntury English society: class struggle without class?", Social History, 
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Yet even as Thompson uses it, class is an expression which is open to observation 
and measurement because it is possible to identify squires, workers, businessmen, and the 
members of other social groups, their common and differing experiences, and the way they 
defined these characteristics. These social categories, which changed over time, express, 
if not class itself, perceptions of social difference and variation, and the statements about 
these matters found in such places as Dod's Parliamentary Companion and Burke's Landed 
Gentry are the more valuable because they represent not only the way other contemporaries 
felt about individuals and groups, but also the ways those individuals felt about themselves. 
No one would advise the rash use of such materials for, like all historical materials, 
they are imperfect. Caution is always necessary, especially when we find negative results 
in comparing the data on social class with political actions in the com-laws and home rule 
crises. 9 Indeed a modem study of electoral behaviour during the period from 1885 to 1918 
has cast the gravest doubt upon the value of social conflict theories in accounting for the 
actions of constituents. 10 Other considerations, as this paper will show, factors other than 
social class, such as partisanship and constituency background, sometimes supervened. 
In his famous paper on the growth of class consciousness in early Victorian England, Asa 
Briggs attributes it to four events, the imposition of Pitt's income tax, the impact of the 
Napoleonic war, the struggle for parliamentary reform, and the com law controversy. 11 
Each of these events had profound political elements, and one cannot help but be driven 
to thoughts about the ways in which thinking about class was rooted in thinking about 
politics and the ways in which consciousness of social positions was embedded in con-
sciousness of political positions. Between class conditions and action, as Giovanni Sartori 
has observed, there are intervening variables, the working and influence of institutions, 
which generate class feeling. 12 What follows, therefore, is a scrutiny of the parliamentary 
responses to the London riots of 1886 to see how far class concepts can be used to account 
for the behaviour of Members of the House of Commons. 
The facts of the case can be readily summarized. On the afternoon of 8 February 
1886, a meeting of the unemployed summoned by the Fair Trade League gathered in 
Trafalgar Square. The Social Democratic Federation, led by H.M. Hyndman, disrupted 
the meeting, denounced the Tories and their efforts to exploit unemployment, and put 
forward a programme of revolution and socialism. After some pushing and shoving, the 
S.D.F. led part of the crowd out of the Square and towards Hyde Park. In Pall Mall, an-
tagonized by clubmen, the marchers stoned the Carlton and other clubs. Transformed now 
into a riot, the procession attacked property, signs of wealth and privilege, and looted 
Piccadilly. The S.D.F . , having lost control of the situation, retired at Hyde Park, but the 
9. W .0. A YDEWrffi, ''The Countiy Gentlemen and the Repeal of the Corn Laws'', English Historical 
Review, 82 (Jan IIlii)' 1967): 4 7 .(,(); W. C. LUBENOW, "Irish Home Rule and the Social Basis of the Great Separation 
in the Liberal Party in 1886", HistoricalJournal, XXVIII (March 1985). 
10. Kenneth D. W ALD, Crosses on the Ballot: Patterns of British Voter Aligrunent Since 1885 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983). For other treatments of this issue see, Paul T. PHn.uPs, The Sectarian Spirit: 
Sectarianism, Society, and Politics in Victorian Cotton Towns (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982) and 
R.S. NEAlE, Class in English History, /680-/850 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981). For an attempt to rearticulate 
much of the best in a class analysis of social history, see Gareth Stedman JONES, The Language of Class: Studies 
in English Working Class History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
II. Asa BRIGGS, "Middle Class Consciousness in English Politics, 1780-1846", Past and Present, 
9 (Aprill956): 9. 
12. Giovanni SARTORI, "From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology", in Politics and the 
Social Sciences, ed. by Seymour Martin LiPsET, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 83-
85. 
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workers continued on to South Audley Street, ravaging shops as they went, and then re-
turned to the East End by way of Oxford Street. The authorities responded swiftly. Hugh 
Childers, the Home Secretary, sacked Sir Edmund Henderson, the chief commissioner of 
the Metropolitan Police. The Government introduced a bill into Parliament to compensate 
owners and businessmen for their damages. 
It is easy to see how a class interpretation could be placed on the event. Ideas of class 
and class struggles ran rampant in the political thinking of the 1880s. George W. Smalley, 
whose articles in the press provide one account of this episode, described the working-class 
crowd as a mob which consisted of "the criminal classes." Though not a social revolution 
as described by continental observers, ''the Socialists have shown their colours. Hyndman, 
Burns, and the other Trafalgar Square speakers knew perfectly well what sort of men they 
were talking to. They welcomed the brigands of the East End as allies.'' 13 Alfred Pease, 
a Liberal MP who was there at the time, expressed his shock when the rioters assaulted 
Brooks' Club. 
I went with others to the windows, and saw a mob running up St. James's Street- in front were 
about 500 men in loose order, who were running followed by a dense roaring mob which filled 
the street as far as you could see, led by two men carrying small flags , one a red one, on the end 
of sticks. While watching them we suddenly realised they were dangerous, for a great volley of 
stones carne crashing through every window, followed by more, driving us to take covert, some 
members diving under the furniture . The servants had been quick in closing the doors . We re-
mained under a bombardment as long as the great mob was passing, but it travelled very fast , 
and passed in perhaps ten minutes. Forty large panes of glass were smashed to atoms, the floor 
and tables right across to the fireplace were strewn with stones, bits of pavement, glass, books, 
ink pots, and things knocked off the tables . 14 
The Times reported panic in all quarters of London on February 9th and lOth, and what 
one historian has called a grand peur swept the city. Rumours of roughs gathering came 
from Deptford, Whitechapel, Bethnal Green, and Camden Town. The propertied classes 
responded by closing down firms and banks in the City and in the West End, by drawing 
the gates of Downing Street, by shuttering places of business, by barricading the bridges, 
and by calling out the police. 15 
Those with rather more sympathy towards the working classes expressed rather more 
pleasure at this tum of events. Wilfred Scawen Blunt had been in Trafalgar Square as the 
crowd began to gather. He thought it "orderly enough. As far as I c[ oul]d judge the people 
in the Square were bona fide working men, thin & hungry looking, not mere thieves." He 
left and went to have tea with William Morris at Hammersmith; and, as the riot gathered 
force, they "had a long talk ab[ ou ]t the prospects of the 'revolution', but Morris does not 
think it yet in sight." They only learned later what they had missed. When they did, as 
Blunt concluded, "the riot seems to have been more important than at first reported; and 
it will certainly make a landmark in the history of our Revolution, as it is the first time a 
mob has actually pillaged shops & attacked property on principle." Blunt now regretted 
13 . George W. SMALLEY, "The London Riots", in Ldndon Letters and Some Others, 2 vols. (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1890), 330. 
14. Sir Alfred PEASE, Elections and Recollections (London:??, 1932), p. 105. See also Lord Cran-
brook's Diary, 9, 10, II , 12, 13, 15, 19, and 26 February 1886, in The Diary ofGathorne Hardy , Later Lord 
Cranbrook, 1866-1892: Political Selections , ed. Nancy F. JOHNSON (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1981), 
pp. 597-99. 
15. Gareth Stedman JONES, Outcast London: A Study of the Relationship Between Classes in Victorian 
Society (Oxford, The Clarendon Press: 1971 ), pp. 292ff. 
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that he had not joined the S.D.F. in 1884, when Hyndman had invited him. "My sympathy 
is entirely with the destructive part of socialism. It is only the constructive I cannot stom-
ach." When Blunt visited the Carlton Club two days later he found all attention still riveted 
on the riot. Sydney Herbert, who had recently won the Croydon by-election for the Con-
servatives, "could not raise a smile" when Blunt joked about it. 16 Later Morris described 
the riot and its aftermath as "the first skirmish of the Revolution." Edward Avling believed 
a ''revolutionary situation would have existed, had the socialists been able to prepare for 
it.'' Engels described the rioters of February 8 as ''masses of the poor devils of the East 
End who vegetate in the borderland between working class and lumpen-proletariat, and 
a sufficient admixture of roughs and 'arrays' to leaven the whole into a mass ready for any 
'lark' up to a wild riot a propos de rien. '' George Gissing, who was writing his novel Derrws 
at the time, took much of his understanding of working-class politics from his own expe-
riences in the 1880s, and the riot at the end of his novel is said to be based upon the events 
of 1886. 17 Whether this was a social revolution or not, whether it can be considered part 
of the proletariat's history, whether or not the London riots were based upon, or spawned, 
class feeling, contemporaries judged the event in terms of class conflict and class animosity. 
E.P. Thompson, whose word on such matters must always be consulted, summarizes one 
kind of conclusion which can be drawn from this evidence. "All the submerged class-fears 
and hatred of the bourgeoisie, ''he writes, ''suffered nearly a week of naked exposure.'' 18 
What about the reception of the London riots in the House of Commons? How far 
were parliamentary reactions, and the formulation of policy, governed by ideas of class 
warfare? How far were the motivations of Members of Parliament dictated by economic 
interest? Not many Members spoke in debate, and, as the home rule crisis grew, the ar-
ticulations of eminent politicians took themselves to the cloud in the West, rather than to 
discussing the policy implications of the London riots in their letters, diaries, and memoirs. 
The second reading division on the Compensation for Damages Bill on March 4th, the 
legislation designed to indemnify those who had suffered losses in the riots, provides 
evidence which can be examined in an assessment of the social basis of political action. 
Here Members could assert, by extending or withholding their political support, their re-
actions to social crisis because they could reveal by their willingness to indemnify those 
who had suffered losses in the riots their sympathy towards property values or towards 
protests against those values. 
This division list includes, insofar as they voted, the legislative decisions on the in-
demnification question by the Members of the House of Commons. Some Members could 
not vote, having been expelled for reasons of electoral corruption or having passed to the 
fathers. Others may have been absent from the House because of professional or business 
interests. So, while incomplete, there is no missing evidence, and division list data are likely 
to be the most complete political information that historians can have. When evidence about 
the backgrounds of Members of the House of Commons is compared with their votes, it 
is possible to say something about the grounds and motivations of their political behaviour. 
This latter evidence includes whether or not they belonged to the landed classes, that is 
16. Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge, Blunt MSS., 334-1975, ff. 45-46,46-47, W.S. Blunt Diary, 
8, 9, and 10 February 1886. 
17. These references are cited in Stedman JONES, Outcast London, p. 345. See also Pierre CouSTILLAS, 
ed., London and the Life of Literature in Lore Victorian England: The Diary of George Gissing, Novelist 
(Lewisburg, PA.: Bucknell University Press. 1978), p. 15; Jacob KORG, "Introduction"; George GISSING, Denws: 
A Story of English Socialism (New York: AMS Press Edition, 1971), p. iv; GISSING, Demos, pp. 453-54. 
18. E.P. THOMPSON, William Mo"is: Romilntic to Revolutionary (New York: Pantheon, 1977), p. 406. 
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whether they were connected to the peerage, the baronetage, or the landed gentry through 
the paternal line, through maternal descent, or through marriage. (It is possible to assess 
their votes in light of business or professional interests as well, but this analysis turned up 
nothing, and the most important social data proved to be whether or not Members were 
associated with the landed classes.) 19 1be evidence concerning the background of MPs in 
what follows also includes their partisan affiliations, that is whether they were Conserv-
atives, Liberals, or Irish Nationalists. Finally, this evidence includes material on 'the con-
stituencies of MPs, particularly the region in which MPs' constituencies were located, the 
size of the electorates of those constituencies, and whether those constituencies were county, 
borough, or university seats. 20 This evidence on the partisan affiliation of Members and 
the nature and location of their constituencies makes it possible to consider alternative 
hypotheses and to judge how far the cross-pressures imposed by party and constituency 
may have altered or limi-ted the significance of voting along social lines. 
When the evidence of parliamentary voting is compared with the evidence concerning 
the social, political, and constituency backgrounds of Members, the results can be expressed 
in the table which follows. 
The evidence on the social backgrounds of Members shows a social basis and motivation 
for political behaviour. There is a positive relationship between the votes of Members and 
whether or not they were landed gentlemen. Members having no connections to landed 
society tended to divide themselves nearly equally on the question, but with a slight majority 
opposing the bill . On the other hand, landed gentlemen supported it decisively. 
This pattern holds up when the social basis of the votes of Conservatives alone is 
considered. Tories who were not landed gentlemen tended to support it. Not enough 
Conservatives spoke in the debate on the bill to use their spoken words as amplifications 
or explanations of their votes, and the votes themselves describe a pattern rather than reveal 
its meaning, but much of the debate by Conservatives goes against a social interpretation 
of Tory voting behaviour. Sir Robert Peel, Bt. (Conservative: Blackburn), the owner of 
9,000 acres and the holder of the family seat of Drayton Manor near Tamworth, far from 
supporting the bill as other Tory landed gentlemen tended to do, was one of its leading 
19. Dod's Parliamentary Companion , Edward Walford's Great Families (1886), the various editions 
of Burke's Peerage and Baronetage and Landed Gentry, (G .E. C.) The Complete Peerage, The Financial Reform 
Almanack, The liberal Yearbook, 1887, The Constitutional Yearbook, 1887, and the thousands of autobiographies 
and pious biographies for the period provide a wealth of evidence concerning the connections of MPs to the 
peerage, the baronetage, and the landed gentry, as well as their business and professional interests and their 
educational backgrounds. In the statistical tests upon which the analysis of this paper is based, I compared voting 
on the Compensation for Damages Bill with all of these data. The relationship between voting and landed status 
was the most fruitful and revealed the most interesting pattern, and it is that comparison which is reported here. 
20. The sources from which this evidence was drawn include Dod's Parliamentary Companion; The 
Constitutional Yearbook, 1887; The Liberal Yearbook, 1887; F.W.S. CRAIG, British Parliamentary Election 
Results, 1885-1918 (London: Macmillan, 1974); Frederick H. McCALMONT, ed. , The Parliamentary Poll Book 
of All Elections from the Reform Act of 1832 to February 1910 (London: 1910, 7th edition). All students of British 
elections, of course, look to Henry PaLING, The Social Geography of British Elections, 1885-1910 (London, 
Melbourne, Toronto, and New York: Macmillan, 1967) for guidance. The use of these data does not commit 
the ecological fallacy because they refer neither to electors or to their behaviour. These data reveal characteristics 
of constituencies, not electors, and the point is to see if there is a relationship between certain kinds of constituencies 
and the MPs who sat for them. Other studies which have made signal advances using an analysis of the attributes 
of constituencies include W.O. AYDEWITE,"Constituency Influence on the British House of Commons, 1841, 
1847", in The History of Parliamentary Behavior, ed. W.O. AYDEWITE, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1977); Hugh W. STEPHENS and David W. BRADY, "The Parliamentary Parties and the Electoral Reforms of 1884-
1885 in Britain", Legislative Studies Quarterly , l , 4 (1976): 491-510. 
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Table I Social CI~W>, Partisan, and Comtituency 8&'ies of Voting-Second Reading, 
Compensation for Damages Bill, March 4, 1886 
I. Social Class: %+ %- N 
Whole House 
Landed Gentlemen 81 19 64 
Not Landed Gentlemen 44 56 127 
Conservatives Only 
Landed Gentlemen 78 22 32 
Not Landed Gentlemen 31 69 32 
Liberals Only 
Landed Gentlemen 90 10 30 
Not Landed Gentlemen 84 16 61 
II. Partisan Affiliation: 
Conservatives 64 35 45 
Liberals 86 14 91 
Irish Nationalists 2 98 53 
Ill . Region of Members' 
Constituencies: 
Southern England 83 17 48 
Northern England 73 27 60 
Wales 67 33 8 
Scotland 80 20 15 
Ulster 25 75 16 
Southern Ireland 2 98 41 
University 100 0 I 
IV. Type of Members' Constituency: 
County 48 52 115 
Borough 71 29 73 
University 100 0 I 
v. The Size of Electorate 
in Members' Constituencies: 
0-4999 Electors 33 67 9 
5000-7499 Electors 36 64 47 
7500-8999 Electors 42 58 43 
9000 + Electors 77 23 90 
Sources: Dod's Parliamentary Companion (1886) Bwke's Landed Gentry (1886), Craig's British Parliamentary 
Election Results, 1885-1918 (1974). 
opponents. His biographer described this strange man as one wanting in "moral fibre ." 
"His volatile character, an absence of dignity, an inability to accept a fixed political creed, 
prevented him from acquiring the confidence of his associates or the public. " 21 Peel had 
been a junior Lord of the Admiralty in 1855 and was considered a Liberal. He became Chief 
21. Dictionary of National Biography, XLIV, p. 223. 
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Secretary for Ireland, also in a Liberal Government. By 1874 Peel had come to consider 
himself a Liberal-Conservative and he opposed Gladstone's Near East policies. The electors . 
at Huntington returned him to the House of Commons as a Conservative in 1884. Peel 
sought office in Salisbury's first administration, but found himself frustrated in this. He 
was "concerned and grieved" to think he had "incurred the heavy displeasure of the 
Queen" in such a manner as to disbar himself from government. In 1885 the electors of 
Blackburn returned him as a Conservative, and Peel wrote to Salisbury to congratulate him 
on his son's success at Darwen. 22 Unable to find a place for himself in Tory ruling circles, 
Peel's relations with his leaders eroded during the spring of 1886. He abstained on the home 
rule bill, the only Conservative to do so. In the general election of 1886 Peel stood as the 
Liberal candidate for Inverness Burghs, with the support of Mr. Gladstone, against Robert 
Finlay, the sitting Member and a Liberal Unionist, whom Gladstone described to Peel as 
"one of the keenest and most vehement adversaries to the policy which you and I think 
to be recommended by the broad principles of justice and by clear dictates of expediency.'' 
In the same letter Gladstone went on to describe Finlay's political position in such a way 
as to shed light on both Peel's and Gladstone's notions of correct partisan behaviour. Finlay 
"calls and thinks himself a Liberal Unionist but this is Toryism of the worst type, the To-
ryism which breaks up Empires, the Toryism of George ill and Lord North, not the Toryism 
which will ever stand associated with the name of Robert Peel .'' 23 With such a political 
creature as this third baronet it is perhaps not possible to expect political or social con-
sistency. His vote on the Compensation for Damages Bill was atypical of the trend in the 
votes of other Tory landed gentlemen. His speeches on the bill, moreover, dwelt upon 
regional rather than social considerations. He regarded the bill as a "grievous injustice that 
would be inflicted on large provincial towns such as Nottingham, Manchester, Blackburn, 
Ashton, and other places where popular tumults may accidentally arise. " 24 
A similar point can be made for Stanley Leighton's intervention in the debate. 
Leighton, the second son of Sir Baldwyn Leighton, Bt., whose estates in Shropshire ex-
ceeded 4,000 acres, sat as the Conservative Member for the Oswestry division of Shrop-
shire. Like Peel, Leighton was a landed gentleman; like Peel, Leighton opposed the 
Compensation for Damages Bill, and, like Peel, Leighton opposed it on regional rather 
than social grounds. "Why should the whole country pay for London," Leighton asked, 
" if London does not help pay for the whole country?" 25 Sir Robert Fowler, a banker as 
well as a baronet, who sat as a Conservative for the City of London, supported the bill, 
but as a measure protecting the interests of his constituency rather than as a protection for 
property. ''This Bill is one of great importance to the Metropolis, and it is because it only 
applies to the Metropolis that the Government are asked to postpone its consideration. " 26 
Even in defending the measure this Conservative resorted to a constituency plea. John 
Edmund Wentworth Addison, a banister and Queen's Counsel, the Conservative Member 
for Ashton, like other Tories who were not landed gentlemen, opposed the Bill, but not 
because he wished for property to lack protection. As in the cases of Peel and Leighton, 
Addison spoke on behalf of regional interests, and asked the Home Secretary to ''enlarge 
22. Hatfield House, Herts., 3d Marquess of Salisbury MSS .. Cla-;s E, Peel to Salisbury, 6 June 1885. 
29 June 1885, and 4 December 1885. 
23. British Library. Gladstone Papers. Additional MSS., 44548, folio 103, Gladstone to Peel , 23 June 
1886. 
24. Hansard (1886) 3d ser.. 302: 2001 . 
25. Hansard (1886) 3d ser .. 302: 2007. 
26. Hansard ( 1886) 3d ser .. 302: 2004. 
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his measure, or bring in one which will remedy the grievance not only of the Metropolis 
but of the whole country.'' 27 The thrust of the debates, consequently, ran in a direction 
different from the thrust of Tory voting. Tory voting shows a clear pattern of social influence 
in political behaviour. In their debates, Peel, Addison, and Leighton reflected a regional 
rather than a social influence. And this is a point to which this essay will shortly return. 
When one turns to the pattern of Liberal voting on the Compensation for Damages 
Bill quite a different aspect of the case emerges. This shows no relationship at all between 
the social background of Liberals and their votes. The Liberals did not divide themselves 
along class lines. They were the party of Government, this was a Government measure, 
and therefore, for the Liberals, this was a party question. The fissioning and fractioning 
of the Liberal party, so evident in this parliamentary session, 28 was not present in voting 
on the Compensation for Damages Bill. They were not absolutely united, but 86 percent 
of the Liberals who voted supported the measure. Those who dissented expressed views 
rather like those of Peel, Leighton, and Addison on the Tory side: they were not opposed 
to the protections which ought to be granted to property; they wished to defend regional 
interests against the claims of the metropolis. As Henry Labouchere (Liberal: Northampton) 
put it: 
As we know, the State bears four-ninthsofthecostofthe Metropolitan Police-it is alleged it 
does that because the police are used for public seJVices- but there is really no earthly reason 
why the Exchequer should pay four-ninths of the damage recently done in London. 29 
In calling for equal treatment for the metropolis and the provinces, Alfred Illingworth 
(Liberal: Bradford West) and John Carvell Williams (Liberal : Nottingham South) took a 
similar line. 30 
As the pattern of Liberal voting makes clear, partisanship is a factor with which to 
reckon in any interpretation of the parliamentary responses to the London riots. As the 
evidence in the table about the relationship between party affiliation and voting makes even 
clearer, this was a question of the Liberals and a majority of the Conservatives, together, 
against the Irish Nationalists . Conservatives may have disagreed amongst themselves on 
this measure, and their disagreement followed class lines, but two-thirds of the Tories 
supported the bill. They joined a much more united Liberal Party. The Irish Nationalists, 
almost unanimously, opposed the bill . This point can be put rather more sharply by de-
scribing the relative positions of the Conservative and Liberal leaders on this occasion. Front 
bench Members of both parties, reflecting their governmental and administrative expe-
rience, strongly supported the bill; the whole of the Liberal front bench, all fourteen Liberal 
leaders who voted on the second reading of this measure, and all Conservative leaders save 
one, voted for the bill. The opposition to the bill carne from a united Irish Nationalist party 
who were joined in the division lobby by isolated Members of the Liberal and Conservative 
backbenches. 
The strong Irish Nationalist opposition to the Compensation for Damages Bill opens 
the possibility that voting on it was indeed based upon class with the Liberals and Con-
servatives supporting the interests of property and with the Nationalists opposing property 
27. Hansard (1886) 3d ser., 302: 2002. 
28. W.C. LUBENOW, " Irish Home Rule and the Great Separation in the Liberal Party in 1886: The 
Dimensions of Parliamentary Liberalism" . Victorian Studies, XXVI (Winter 1983): 161-80. 
29. Hansard (1886) 3d ser. , 302: 2009. 
30. Hansard (1886) 3d ser. , 302: 2010-2011, 2008. 
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interests. This interpretation falls Io the ground once again when one consults the debates. 
Irish Nationalist spokesmen took positions on the measure which were close to those taken 
by Peel, Leighton, Labouchere, and Williams: their primary consideration was region, not 
social class. T .M. Healy, who represented the southern division of Londonderry, criticized 
the Government for bringing in a bill which required provincial towns, towns which might 
themselves suffer outrages, to pay for their own losses while allowing London to charge 
off its damages. John Deasy, an Irish Nationalist whip who sat for the western division 
of county Mayo, said: "I do not see why we in Ireland should be asked to contribute towards 
the payment of any damages done in England, unless it is understood that the people of 
England are also prepared to contribute their portion of the cost of any damage done during 
riots in Ireland. " 31 
Partisanship and the holding of government offices, then, are two qualifications which 
must be made to a class interpretation of the parliamentary responses to the London riots, 
and an impression gained from a reading of the Conservative, Liberal, and Irish Nationalist 
speeches in the parliamentary debates is that the constituency attributes of MPs is a third. 
In the first place, as the evidence in the table makes clear, there was a strong regional pattern 
to the voting. Large majorities of Members from English, Scottish, and Welsh consti-
tuencies (these were slightly less in northern England and Wales) supported the Com-
pensation for Damages Bill. Members from Ulster and Southern Ireland (these were the 
Irish Nationalists, of course) opposed the bill. There is even a regional bias amongst 
Conservative landed gentlemen: Tory Members who were connected with the peerage-
baronetage-landed gentry who sat for northern English seats were nearly equally divided 
on the measure (six supported the measure and five opposed it), while those who sat for 
southern English seats supported the measure by a proportion of nearly six to one (twelve 
voted for the bill and two voted against it). There was an additional urban-rural aspect to 
voting on the Compensation for Damages Bill, as these constituency reckonings indicate. 
Members for counties, with nearly equal proportions, stood on both sides of the question. 
Members sitting for boroughs, on the other hand, and by a substantial majority, supported 
it. Furthermore, Members who held constituencies with small eleciorates, presumably the 
less urban seats, tended to oppose the bill while MPs whose constituencies had even larger 
electorates, presumably the more urban seats, tended to support it in even larger proportions. 
To summarize, as this analysis of parliamentary voting has shown, there is some 
evidence which supports a social class interpretation of the parliamentary responses to the 
London riots in 1886. Principally this is found in the descriptions of votes for the House 
of Commons as a whole and in the votes of the Conservatives taken by themselves. 
However, when the debates and the votes of the Liberals and the Irish Nationalists are 
examined, and when the constituency characteristics of Members are brought to bear, 
different patterns of political motivation emerge. In these patterns the cleavages fall along 
partisan and regional lines, as opposed to those of social class. The trend in the figures is 
stark and staring and it is a trend which is inconvenient to those who wish Io impose social 
conflict theories on parliamentary politics. To put the matter another way, if social class 
in parliamentary politics is treated as a testable hypothesis, it does not test very well. It is 
always uncomfortable to find oneself going against established interpretations of political 
events, but, as the figures for partisan and regional behaviour reveal, one can only take 
comfort sheltered beneath the arch of probability. 
31. Hansard (1886) 3d ser., 302:2000-2001 , 2009,2011. 
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The pattern of regional cleavage is sufficiently important to deserve additional ex-
planation because it defies the broad body of modernization theory which incorporates 
interest and class theories of political conflict. In the modem state, after all, territorial 
conflicts were supposed to be replaced by social conflicts, nation-wide, whose basis was 
differing economic interests. The patterns of regional cleavage discovered in parliamentary 
voting on the Compensation for Damage Bill in 1886 are manifestations of peripheral-
central conflict through which regional impulses resisted the centralizing and integrating 
efforts of strong political centres. This was no new thing. It was a political consequence 
of events involved in the medieval formation of the English state. These events had forged 
a traditional territorial structure through a process in which the central offices of the state 
established control over outlying regions while at the same time providing for the direct 
representation of regional elites at Westminster. The Irish Act of Union in 1800 was only 
the most recent expression of this strategy. 32 At times in the nineteenth century the tensions 
between centre and peripheries had a class edge and content to them, but only in the sense 
in which they were about class issues; conflict was not fundamentally between class interests 
and class groups, and class politics had to be fitted into this older territorial style. 33 Territorial 
conflict was not merely the persistence of an anachronism in modem politics, nor was it 
a reactionary force. It was- and is- a radicalizing element, enhanced by romantic culture 
in an industrial age which gets its bonding power from a capacity to draw on sentiments 
and feelings which are at odds with industrial machinery and the machinery of the modem 
state. If these territorial conflicts were not new in Britain in the nineteenth century, neither 
were they unique to Britain; and expressions of the same phenomena can be found in 
German and French legislative politics at the time of the revolutions of 1848, and in the 
British House of Commons during the same period. 34 
Something, however, was new in the 1880s. Regional forces were released, almost 
paradoxically, by processes such as industrialization, urbanization, and electoral reform, 
processes which modernization theory presumes should produce political integration. The 
democratic reforms of the nineteenth century, of which the franchise and redistribution 
reforms of 1884-1885 were the most recent and the most powerful, acted as forces for 
political organization and mobilization. Indeed, one aspect of these processes was inte-
grative: they brought newer and larger numbers of persons and groups into the political 
system. Another aspect of these processes, however, was disintegrative, at least in its 
potential, in the sense that it stimulated and revived ancient territorial impulses. Because 
the political reforms of the nineteenth century coincided with a vast increase of central 
government's activities, they produced a debate on the existing territorial structure and the 
relationship between the regions and Westminster. Additionally, they provided the political 
means for mobilizing this debate. 35 The emergence of the Irish Nationalist party and the 
32. G.C. BOLTON, The Passing of the Irish Act of Union: A Study in Parliamentary Politics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1966). 
33. Derek W. URWIN, " Territorial Structures and Political Developments in the United Kingdom", 
The Politics ofTerritoriallntegrity, ed. Stein ROKKAN and Derek W. URWIN (London, Beverly Hills, and New 
Delhi: Sage Publications, 1982) pp. 43, 54, 65. The regional dimension of political behaviour is also discussed 
in J.P.D. DUNBABIN, "British Elections in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A Regional Approach", 
The English Historical Review, XCV, (Apri11980): 241-67; AYDEJ..(JJ"JE. "Constituency Influence"; STEPHENs 
and BRADY, "Parliamentary Parties and Electoral Reforms". 
34. Heinrich BEST, "Biography and Political Behavior: Determinants of Parliamentary Decision Making 
in Germany, France, and Great Britain in the Nineteenth Centwy" (Social Science HistOI)' Association Annual 
Meeting, Washington, D.C.: October 27-30, 1983), pp. 20-21 , 30. 
35. URWIN, " Territorial Structures", pp. 40-41, 55; and, by the same author, "Towards the Nation-
alization of British Politics?: The Party System, 1885-1940", in Wahlerbewegung in der Europaischen Geschichte, 
ed. 0. BuscH (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1980), pp. 225-58. 
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election of Members to express the grievances of the Scottish crofters in the 1880s are two 
expressions of this kind of mobilization. 
Such effects of democratic reform are only superficially paradoxical. The strong 
association of region with partisanship in which the Conservatives represented the impulses 
of the centre and the Liberals - and later Labour- represented the grievances of territorial 
peripheries blunted centrifugal energies. Wales and Scotland, for example, did not follow 
Ireland into devolutionism: the existing partisan arrangements were sufficient to manage 
their resistance to Westminster and Whitehall; they benefitted from the industrial revolution; 
they could find in imperialism the same kind of hope the English did; and neither had 
experienced the kind of direct intervention expressed by the Dublin Castle regime and the 
settler ascendancy. Becoming strongly rooted in Wales and Scotland, the Liberal party 
declared for these peripheries their characteristic reservations to the territorial constitution: 
Welsh and Scottish disestablishment, land reform of the crofter sort, and demands for the 
Scottish Office. For the Welsh and the Scots and the English of the north representation 
at Westminster retained its political value. When Mr. Gladstone took up Irish home rule 
on behalf of the Liberal party in 1885-1886 he was seeking to preserve, by the same strategy, 
an integrationist approach, a unionist one, for his party in Ireland. For Ireland, this was 
too late and, by 1886, the only thing the Irish wanted from Westminster was liberation, 
not representation. Nonetheless, while serving as representatives of Ireland in the British 
House of Commons, Nationalist MPs could use their votes to represent their regional and 
territorial interests on the occasion of the second reading of the Compensation for Damages 
Bill. These were their interests, not a social interest shared fraternally with the working 
classes of London. 
The point of this discussion of territorial conflicts in parliamentary politics has not 
been to run afield, but rather the reverse: to fit the policy dispute over the parliamentary 
responses to the London riots into the behavioural regime it best fits. Now, it might be 
objected that voting on this legislation was unrepresentative of political behaviour in the 
nineteenth century. And so it was, but in a very special and technical sense only. When 
all of the divisions of this parliamentary session are examined to construct ordinal scales 
of the Guttman type, 36 an extensive dimension describing left-right ideological voting in 
the House of Commons emerges. The division on the Compensation for Damages Bill does 
not fit it. By itself this division finds an ideological relationship with only nine other items 
(the House of Commons divided on 143 questions in 1886), and, of these nine, only seven 
fit a common voting dimension. This is a way of saying that, statistically speaking, the 
Compensation for Damages Bill stood on the metes and bounds of parliamentary life. What 
put it there? Not, the evidence suggests, the pattern of regional conflict described above, 
but rather a perverse pattern of partisan voting. In voting on items fitting the major ideo-
logical dimension in 1886 the Irish Nationalists and the Liberals tended to support these 
questions, though there is a strong pattern of Liberal dissent, 37 while the Conservatives 
opposed them. In voting on the Compensation for Damages Bill the Liberals are where 
they can be expected: in support of the bill. The Conservatives and the Irish Nationalists 
36. For a dimensional analysis of parliamentary voting in 1886, see my "Ireland, the Great Depression, 
and the Railway Rates: Political Issues and Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons of 1886", Proceedings 
of the American Philosophical Society. vol. 122, 4 (August 1978): 204-13. For other discussions of this approach, 
see W.O. AYDELOTIE, "Voting Patterns in the British House of Commons in the 1840s". Comparative Studies 
in Society and History. V, 2 (January 1963): 134-64; Duncan MacRAE, Jr. ,Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting 
(New York, Evanston, and London: 1970). 
37. See my paper "Irish Home Rule" , passim. 
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are not where one would expect to find them. As the evidence for partisanship described 
in the table above serves to indicate, a substantial majority of the Conservatives supported 
the bill and the Irish Nationalists, almost unanimously, opposed it. It is this voting re-
alignment which cast the bill out of ideological relationship with the other great questions 
of the age. This allows a pretty neat summary of the motivations of the major parliamentary 
groups as they responded to the policy consequences of the London riots: for the Liberals 
it was partisan, for the Tories it was social class, for the Irish Nationalists it was regionalism. 
What is unusual in the voting on this measure is not regional voting, but voting along 
class lines. In the great political disruptions of the nineteenth century, in the com laws crisis 
and the home rule crisis, the parties did not divide themselves along social lines. 38 In fact, 
for much of the nineteenth century social questions were quite on the periphery of parlia-
mentary action. In the 1840s they divided parties39 and, in fact, segregated themselves into 
distinct ideological dimensions. 40 By the 1880s they had become more fully integrated into 
the parliamentary agenda but not as completely as political and land reform, disestablish-
ment, and even Ireland. It would remain for the twentieth century for social questions to 
find their place in parliamentary politics. 41 
This essay began as a discussion of the social basis of political action, and so, but 
as a cautionary tale, it ends. Social conflict theories have been important for very good 
reasons. Of great heuristic and dramatic value, they are pronounced in their narrative uses. 
They have guided much useful research in western politics. They carry great conviction. 
It is a comfort to find, in fact, the pattern of social cleavage in the Conservative party which 
is described above. It is rather gratifying that at least one of our regnant orthodoxies is not 
wholly wrong. Consequently, it is not that social class theories belong to some twilight 
world of fancy, speculation, and moralism; at least no more than other value systems. They 
have an empirical basis, but a basis which is limited and circumscribed by other politically 
forceful elements. Politics is a highly complicated topic, subject to many cross-pressures, 
of which social class is only one. The conditions of their application must be specified with 
great care, and with as much exactness as possible. For the London riots of 1886 and their 
parliamentary aftermath social class describes the nature of public disorder and the par-
liamentary reactions of Conservatives in Parliament to it. For the parliamentary Liberals 
and Irish Nationalists, on the other hand, partisanship tamed social class and territorial 
conflict overlaid it. 
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